We investigated the effect of migration on population dynamics in England &
Introduction
Migration has become an increasingly important factor in population change in European countries; net migration accounted for 85 per cent of population increase in the European Community in 2014 (Eurostat 2015) . Immigration is frequently advocated for its assumed economic benefits, for example: 'There is thus general consensus in the literature that migration is a valid policy approach in the context of a demographic deficit. Immigration to Europe will in the short term achieve immediate increases in total fertility rates, population growth and labour market contribution'. (Harper 2012, p. 2) . Even the nationalistic Russian President Putin has recently advocated selective migration, in addition to increasing fertility, as a way of stimulating population growth in the Russian Federation (Putin 2012) . However, Political concern about the dangers of population decline or growth rates relatively lower than those of neighbouring countries has been a recurrent theme in European history (Teitelbaum and Winter 1985; Winter and Teitelbaum 2013) to show the impact on population size and structure of the migration assumptions adopted. However, even such 'realistic' projections must be treated with caution.
Migration is volatile and the constant or gentle trends drifting towards zero in most scenarios are clearly unrealistic. We need to look at how migration has affected longterm population trends in practice as well as in theory. We require analyses of the experiences of real populations to assess the impact of migration on population size and structure. To our knowledge, few such analyses have been undertaken. Le Bras (1991) and Philipov and Schuster (2010) are exceptions for Europe, but their analyses were not over extended historical periods.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the data used and describe the development of the models we used to estimate the impact of net migration on population size and structure. We then present the results of an analysis that compares trends in England & Wales and Scotland. We discuss the implications of these findings for both demographic history and the role that migration policy played in the 2014 referendum on independence for Scotland.
Data and methods
Data for England & Wales and for Scotland were taken from the Human Mortality Database (HMD), which contains information on estimated mortality rates and population size by single year of age and sex for each calendar year from around the time of the start of national vital registration, 1841 and 1855 respectively. These estimates are based on information from official statistics such as censuses, vital registration, and population estimates over this period (Wilmoth et al. 2007; Human Mortality Database 2015) . The database also includes information on total annual number of births and deaths. Mortality rates are available in both period and cohort We estimated the effect on population dynamics with no net migration by calculating survival of cohorts without migration from various time points starting with the earliest available date of 1855. For example, for those born after the start year of 1855, the population numbers in the absence of migration are given by (a,t-a) where P nomig (a,t) is population aged a in year t B nomig (t-a) is births in year t-a (equivalently for birth cohort t-a) L x (a,t-a) are the L x values for age a based on a life table for the cohort t-a with radix set to 1.
For years after 1855, the numbers of those born before 1855 are given by: (a-(t-1855),t-a) where nomig refers to the no-migration population and actual to the original actual population. Therefore we estimated the expected number of births as follows:
The distribution of age-specific fertility rates f(a), with Σf(a)=1, is given by a beta distribution, β(2.7,2.7), scaled to be between ages 15 and 45 with mean of 30 and standard deviation of 6 years. This is a typical fertility pattern for populations over this period, and in practice results are insensitive to the chosen pattern.
The actual number of births in year t, B orig (t) , is given by:
( 1) where P actual (a,t) is the actual population aged a in year t.
This provides an estimate of k(t), the level of fertility in year t, as the expected number of children per adult with the above fertility distribution.
The number of births in the no-migration population is calculated as
(1) provides an estimate of the level of fertility k(t) and (2) 
Fertility assumptions for no-migration scenarios
We assumed that the fertility rates of the no-migration population were the same as those of the actual population since differences in number of births depends only on populations at risk. This assumption needs to be justified. Immigrants sometimes have elevated fertility after arrival since they may be rejoining families or 'catching up' following the disruption of family life by migration (Hervitz 1985; Andersson 2004 ). On the other hand some migrants may be selected for lower fertility, possibly being more highly educated and career-oriented and in these cases migration may delay or inhibit family formation. The available evidence shows a variety of differences between the fertility level of emigrants and that of the static population.
For example, French migrants to Québec in the eighteenth century had very high fertility while mainland France was already starting to show signs of fertility limitation (Henripin and Péron 1972) . On the other hand, Irish migrants to USA had lower Long-term migration in England & Wales and Scotland 7 fertility than those who remained (Guinnane et al. 2006) . We cannot conclude that either group would have had the same levels if they had not migrated since the Canadian frontier environment was conducive to high fertility whereas urban life in the nineteenth-century US may have been the reverse. US data suggest that migrants from Latin and South America have higher fertility than both those who remain and US natives (Lichter et al. 2012) , although these conclusions are sensitive to the choice of indicator (Parrado 2011) . Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald (2002) found that emigrants to Australia had higher fertility than their peers who remained in the Netherlands, Italy, or Greece, whereas those from the United Kingdom had lower fertility. The differences were small but groups tended to move towards Australian levels. Fertility of intra-European immigrants is similar to levels in the host country across European countries (Office for National Statistics 2014, Table 4; OECD/European Union 2015).
There has been considerable discussion of the interpretation of migrant and non-migrant fertility data, and how pre-and post-arrival patterns can be combined (Toulemon 2004) . However, for our analysis this was not an issue on substantive or technical grounds. There is little evidence of such disruption effects for the European populations we were mainly concerned with (Andersson 2004; Devolder and Bueno 2011) . There is a clear distinction between births prior to migration since the child will be classified as a migrant on arrival, and after migration, when the child will be classified as native. A number of studies suggest that the fertility of second-generation and latergeneration immigrants tends to move towards the level of fertility prevailing in the host country (Glusker 2003; Parrado and Morgan 2008; Waters and Pineau 2015) , and since we were concerned with fertility over multiple generations, this reinforces our case that there appeared to be no strong reason in our initial counterfactual scenario to assume that the fertility of migrants differed from that of the populations we were concerned with.
There is some inconsistency in that the fertility of emigrants is assumed to be that of their original population, whereas that of immigrants is assumed to be that of the host population. This is the standard assumption of no-migration scenarios produced by official agencies. The actual impact of migration on fertility is the difference between the loss of people and their subsequent births owing to emigration and the corresponding gain from immigrants. Although there is evidence that the convergence of fertility to national levels for descendants of those migrant groups originally from some non-European countries is proceeding more slowly than for others (Kulu et al. 2015) , the numbers of these migrant groups were small in former times, and, as we show later, the main trend was that of migrants leaving Great Britain rather than the reverse. Over the extended period of this study, there is no evidence that emigrants from Britain were likely to achieve either higher or lower fertility abroad than if they had remained in their original country. Although we have argued that differentials between native and migrant demography were likely to be relatively small and unimportant for this analysis, there are advantages in looking at an example with negative net migration since the impact of non-native migrants would then be even less than in the case of positive inflows.
If overall observed fertility was higher than native fertility but lower than immigrant fertility, this would give a slightly higher number of births in the nomigration case than if native-only values had been used. The method would underestimate the impact of migration on population change and therefore our results
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would-if anything-be conservative. Since we are concerned not only-or even principally-with the fertility of migrants but also with that of their descendants, who tend to adapt to prevailing levels, this further supports the case for assuming the same fertility for all population groups in this study.
Long-term fertility implications
The estimation procedures we have used are based on net rather than gross an individual of a given age at a particular time point will generate the same average flow of population numbers in years to come irrespective of migration status (in the case of an emigrant, this flow will be negative). While our results are based on the assumption that fertility was the same in the actual and no-migration populations, this assumption can be relaxed if required either to produce alternative scenarios or to incorporate more detailed data if information on long-term gross flows were to become available. However, this would require much more detailed data and strong assumptions (Murphy 2016, forthcoming) .
Results
We present results with net migration being set to zero from 1855 and every 10 years starting from 1860. We show the long-term effects of migration patterns in In England & Wales, the overall net migration rate is close to zero and more years had positive net outflows than net inflows, although migration tended to be negative in the earlier part of the period and positive later.
Net migration was more negative in Scotland than in England & Wales for virtually every decade from the mid-nineteenth century (Table 1) . Over the whole period 1855 to 2013, the annual average net migration rate showed a loss of about 3.1 persons out of every 1,000 in Scotland but the value was close to zero in
England & Wales where the mean gain was 0.2 per 1,000. These values do not, of course, relate only to natives. Emigrants will include immigrants who subsequently move to another country, such as Irish migrants from Scotland, and immigrants will include native-born Scots who return after a period living abroad.
[ Table 1 about here]
We estimated the total impact of migrants and their offspring by comparing the actual values with the no-migration scenarios that allowed for the fact that subsequent birth cohort numbers would differ from those observed since the population of childbearing age would be different. (Table 2 ).
[ Figure 1 and Table 2 [ Table 3 
Natural and total growth
A migration event will change population numbers by one when it occurs. In the longer term, the values from later generations depend on the fertility and mortality of descendants and the extent to which they remain distinctive, though we assume convergence as discussed in the methods section. Population growth is determined not only by migration but also by fertility, mortality, and the sex and age structure of the initial population although the impact of initial conditions becomes attenuated over time. Ultimately different initial populations that are subject to the samepossibly time-varying-rates will have identical age distributions and growth rates in the absence of migration (Arthur 1982 Figure 2a ). Therefore in this period, Scotland's mortality disadvantage was more than offset by its generally higher fertility, using the sex-neutral TFR measure defined in Appendix A (Figure 2b ).
[ Figure 2 ]
The joint effect of fertility and mortality on population change is shown using the NRR-type measure defined in Appendix A and the corresponding intrinsic rate of growth ( Figure 2c ). The NRR value was 20 per cent higher in Scotland than in
England & Wales in the first part of the twentieth century, the same value as that determined by Glass and Blacker (1938) . The Scottish higher intrinsic rate of growth reinforces the conclusion of the earlier analysis that Scotland would have grown faster than England & Wales in the absence of migration over this extended period,
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although fertility has been lower in Scotland than in England & Wales in recent decades. We therefore conclude that migration has been the dominant force in the major divergences in population growth between these two populations, even though the annual difference in proportions of net migrants was only three persons in every 1,000.
Population structure
We now consider the interplay of fertility and mortality trends in relation to the other main focus of the demographic impact of migration, which is its effect on population age structure. Migration is widely advocated as a response to population ageing so we estimated how migration has influenced population ageing over an extended period. We present two widely-used indicators of population ageing: (i) the proportion of people aged 65 and over, and (ii) the potential support ratio, the ratio of people of nominal working age, 20 to 64, to those aged 65 and over. This gives the number of potential workers per nominal retiree, the reciprocal of the so-called old-age dependency ratio (OADR).These measures are demographic ratios rather than indicators of social or economic dependency, and they ignore the fact that over time typical ages at starting and finishing working life have changed. Nevertheless, the measures are in widespread use in discussions of population ageing. and values were similar irrespective of migration. For Scotland, the effect of migration is larger and its outcome has been to make the population structure older, with the proportion aged 65 and over typically being about 1.5 percentage points higher than it would have been with no migration. In consequence, the observed pattern in Scotland is closer to that observed in England & Wales than it is to the Scottish no-migration pattern.
Rather than the proportion aged over 65, we prefer to concentrate on the potential support ratio of nominal workers to retirees since this is more directly related to economic sustainability (Figure 3b ). The potential support ratio was less favourable in Scotland than in England & Wales in the nineteenth century and early part of the twentieth, but more recently it has been broadly similar and even slightly larger than that of England & Wales. However, without migration, Scotland would have had a distinctly more favourable profile, typically by about an additional working-age person for each retiree over the twentieth century. High migration from Scotland in the early part of the twentieth century (Table 2) led to a deficit of older people many decades later that partially offset the impact on population ageing of larger fertility falls in Scotland than in England & Wales in recent decades. However, the main conclusion is that the impact of migration on population ageing was limited, typically shifting the curves in Figure 3 by about 15 to 20 years, with this lag tending to fall over time as the impact of migration early in the twentieth century faded. Even though Scotland had very high migration rates compared with other European countries over this extended time scale, the effect on population structure was limited and declining over this period. The larger potential support ratio for Scotland than for England & Wales in the no-migration case is a result of the fact that the population would have been growing more quickly owing to its higher fertility and therefore the ratio of young to old age groups would have been higher. Scotland. The population is less than half the size it would have been in the absence of that emigration, but the effect on population structure has been very modest. The emigration has led to only a relatively small change in the proportion of older people in the population as compared to England & Wales, where emigration has had little effect on either size or structure.
We have compared two constituent parts of the United Kingdom, one part with negligible levels of net migration and one where it has been substantial. They have been subject to similar, although not identical, social and governance systems, but the substantial differences in economic opportunities between the two have led to very different migration pressures and trends (Devine 2012) . Concerns about the level of immigration have increased substantially in recent years, and it is a major issue in the debates preceding another referendum, in June 2016, that in which the subject is the United Kingdom's membership of the European Union.
Our findings reinforce the conclusion from earlier theoretical studies that migration is likely to have little effect on long-term population structure in decades to come. Results that depend on assumptions about migration patterns well in excess of 50 years ahead may have difficulty in convincing sceptics, but we have shown that shown that migration has had a substantial effect only on population size.
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Appendix A
The fertility measure k(t) is the average number of children per person required to produce the observed number of births in that year. This is based on an assumed pattern of fertility between ages 15 to 45 given by a beta distribution as discussed in the Methods section. It is similar in interpretation to a gross reproduction rate (GRR) except that it relates all births to all adults, rather than confining daughters to women, i.e. it is also an age-standardized fertility measure for a population that contains equal numbers of people in each single-year-of-age group but in which fertility rates vary from year-to-year. Since we did not have annual age-specific fertility rates for even half the period analysed, we could not compute indicators such as TFR, GRR, or NRR in the traditional way. Therefore our approach is analogous to indirect standardization with a fixed rate distribution used to compare the observed number of events and expected number of events with the no-migration population.
We used both sexes combined for consistency with the rest of the analysis, although we have replicated these calculations for daughters per woman and sons per man separately to assess the sensitivity of results to these alternatives (all the analyses presented here can be undertaken separately for males and females). In order to compare the value of children per adult, we multiplied the value by 2 to approximate to the average number of children per woman so this indicator (Total, shown in Appendix Figure A) is on the same scale as the traditional TFR. We also Trends in values for men, women, and both sexes combined are very similar, but the levels are slightly different. This is largely because the number of men aged 15 to 45 was smaller than the number of women in the same age group in earlier periods, so that each man in this age range would need to have more children on average to obtain the same number of births.
The results with these alternative fertility indices are very similar and do not lead to any substantive differences in the interpretation of our findings related to the impact of migration on population size and structure that is the subject of this paper.
Since the method is based on the ratio of populations at risk of actual and nomigration populations, any biases would be expected to affect estimates in the same way.
We have also constructed a period measure analogous to the conventional net reproduction rate by multiplying the beta distribution values by the L x values in the period life table of a given year to obtain the expected number of children a newborn would expect to have if he or she experienced the period fertility and mortality rates of a given year throughout life. We used these period fertility measures together with mortality estimates to compare the demographic regimes in England & Wales and Scotland in Figure 2 . From this NRR-type measure, we also estimated the intrinsic rate of growth on the basis that the NRR is approximately the result of the annual intrinsic crate of growth continued for the mean length of generation, here assumed to be 30 years. This gives the mean age of the fertility schedule in our application as r=ln(NRR)/30. These values are shown in Figure 3c .
We also assessed the sensitivity of the procedure to the assumed agespecific fertility schedule by altering the parameters of the beta distribution to change from an initial mean of 30 years to 26 years in 1970 before moving it back to 30 years by 2010, to reflect some of the main changes in the timing of fertility over the period. We find that this makes no meaningful difference to our conclusions. 
